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Abstract 
      The IEEE 802.11i standard has been designed to 
enhance security in wireless networks. The EAP-TLS 
handshake aims to provide mutual authentication 
between supplicant and authentication server, and 
then derive the Pairwise Master Key (PMK). In the 
4-way handshake the supplicant and the 
authenticator use PMK to derive a fresh pairwise 
transient key (PTK). The PMK is not used directly 
for security while assuming the supplicant and 
authenticator have the same PMK before running 4-
way handshake. In this paper, the EAP-TLS 
handshake and the 4-way handshake phases have 
been analysed with a proposed framework using 
Isabelle tool.  In the analysis, we have found a new 
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack in the 4-way 
handshake. The attack prevents the authenticator 
from receiving message 4 after the supplicant sends 
it out. This attack forces the authenticator to re-send 
the message 3 until time out and subsequently to de-
authenticate supplicant. This paper has proposed 
improvements to the 4-way handshake to avoid the 
Denial-of-Service attack. 
1. Introduction
One of the great challenges for wireless 
environments is to provide enough strong protection 
to the data packages exchanged over WLANs. 
Eavesdropping attacks can be conducted in WLANs 
by potential attackers with suitable radio receivers 
and little effort. So attackers can attack a WLAN 
with difficult detection or prevention [1]. The wired 
equivalent privacy protocol (WEP) has been the first 
attempt proposed to protect the data packages 
exchanged over WLANs. However, WEP does not 
provide strong protection to the data packages 
exchanged over WLANs, especially in encryption. In 
June 2004, the IEEE task group i developed a new 
standard called 802.11i to avoid the weaknesses in 
WEP and to enhance confidentiality, integrity and 
mutual authentication [2]. 
 The 802.11i standard involves three entities 
called supplicant (wireless device), authenticator 
(access point) and authentication server. All six 
phases of the 802.11i standard are important to 
achieve authentication, especially for the EAP-TLS 
handshake and the 4-way handshake. The EAP-TLS 
Handshake includes a series of message exchange 
between the entities in specific order. The order of 
messages is significant in EAP-TLS handshake, 
whereas a number of options are available. The 
access point participates the EAP-LTS handshake as 
a reply without checking the content of messages [3]. 
The 4-way handshake aims to establish a fresh 
session key between the access point and the 
wireless device. There are three tasks for the access 
point and the wireless device to achieve successfully 
in the 4-way handshake phase. Firstly, establish 
random nonces to verify the liveliness of each other. 
Then, confirm the existence of the PMK at the access 
point and the wireless device. Finally, generate the 
group transient key (GTK) by the access point and 
transfer the GTK to the wireless device [4]. 
The phases of IEEE 802.11i Standard can be 
analysed using linear temporal logic. Alabdulatif et 
al. have proposed a framework which can be used to 
investigate and analyse the EAP-LTS handshake and 
the 4-way handshake [5,6]. This framework can be 
classified as a theorem proving method, which is 
used to analyse all possible behaviours of a protocol 
to ensure they meet a set of correctness conditions 
[7]. There are a number of general rules and 
assumptions in the framework that can be used to 
analyse many protocols. Isabelle is one of the tools 
that can be used to implement the framework and to 
analyse protocols. In this paper, we use the proposed 
framework to successfully identify a DoS attack in 
the 4-way handshake.     
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 will 
introduce the IEEE 802.11i standard. Section 3 will 
provide the framework adjusted for analysing the  
802.11i standard  using Isabelle. Section 4 will show 
the analysis of EAP-TLS handshake. Section 5  will 
present the analysis of 4-way handshake. Section 6 
will show how to defend against the denial of service 
attack on the 4-way handshake. Section 7 will 
present conclusions and future work. 
2. IEEE 802.11i standard
The IEEE 802.11i standard provides 
confidentiality, integrity and mutual authentication 
of the WLANs security. There are two mechanisms 
used to achieve confidentiality and integrity of data, 
namely the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) 
and the Counter Cipher Mode with Block Chaining 
Message Authentication Code Protocol (CCMP). 
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The TKIP is a temporary solution for the WEP flaws, 
whereas the CCMP is a comprehensive solution 
requiring specific hardware features. For the mutual 
authentication the 802.11i standard defines a Robust 
Security Network (RSN) with two new protocols, the 
first of which is the 4-Way Handshake and the other 
is Group Key Handshake [4,8]. The aim of the paper 
focuses on analysing the authentication aspect, 
especially in the EAP-TLS Handshake and the 4-
Way Handshake phase. 
2.1.  Overview of the 802.11i standard phases 
The 802.11i standard has six sequential phases to 
achieve authentication among the authentication 
server, the access point and the wireless device. In 
each phase there are some tasks that should be 
achieved successfully to meet the security target of 
the phase. The success of authentication means the 
wireless device and the access point are identified 
and verified by each other and a secret key is 
established for exchanging encrypted data over 
WLANs. Figure 1 shows that the authentication 
procedures consists of six phases as follows: a) 
discover phase, b) authentication and association 
phase, c) EAP/802.1x/RADIUS authentication, d) 4-
way handshake, e) group key handshake, f) secure 
data communication [9]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. IEEE 802.11i authentication phases 
The first phase in the IEEE 802.11i standard is 
the network discovery phase. The aim of this phase 
is that a wireless device selects one of the access 
points available and corresponding security 
capabilities. There are two ways to choose 
appropriate access points. One way is that the 
wireless device observes the Beacon frames and 
identifies  the access point by these frames. The 
other way is that the wireless device can send a 
probe request frame to obtain a response frame from 
all access points available [10,11]. 
The second phase is authentication and 
association. It aims to perform authentication and 
association with a specific access point for 
communication. The wireless device selects an 
access point from the list created in the previous 
phase. Then the association between the wireless 
device and the access point is built up through 
negotiating the security capabilities. The open 
system authentication is used to indicate backward 
compatibility. In this phase, the authentication 
between the wireless device and access point is 
insecure and the secure mutual authentication will be 
in the next phase  [10,11]. 
The IEEE802.1X authentication phase is the third 
phase. This phase aims to provide mutual 
authentication. The wireless device and the 
authentication server have to authenticate each other. 
The wireless device and the authentication server 
establish a Master Session Key (MSK). The wireless 
device uses the MSK to derive the PMK where the 
authentication server transfers the key material to 
access point to derive the same PMK. The wireless 
device and the access point may ignore the third 
phase if both of them have pre-Shared Key (PSK) or 
cashed PMK used in re-association[10,11] . 
The 4-way handshake is the fourth phase. It aims 
to verify that the access point is legitimate and 
establish a fresh session key PTK between the access 
point and the wireless device [2]. The wireless 
device may request to run the 4-way handshake 
protocol or the access point may start by itself and 
both have the same PMK before running the 4-way 
handshake protocol [12]. 
The fifth phase is  group key handshake phase. It 
aims to distribute a fresh Group Temporal Key 
(GTK) to wireless devices. The access point is able 
to generate the GTK and multicast to the wireless 
devices in this phase. When the GTK has been 
distributed in the previous phase the group key 
handshake phase will be unnecessary. The GTK 
distribution may be repeated multiple times from the 
same access point [10,11]. 
The last phase is secure data exchange phase and 
it aims to establish a secure channel between the 
access point and the wireless device. 
After all necessary phases are achieved 
successfully, the wireless device can connect with 
access point using fresh PTK or GTK to protect data 
packets. 
2.1.1. The EAP-TLS handshake. The EAP-TLS 
represents the integration of the EAP framework and 
a) Network Discovery
a) Network
Discovery
b)Authentication and Association
a) Network
Discovery
c) IEEE802.1X Authentication
d) 4- Way Handshake
e) Group key Handshake
f) Secure Data Communication
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TLS protocol [13]. There are ten steps to achieve the 
EAP-TLS handshake. The EAP messages start and 
end with same sequence. As shown in figure 2, we 
assume EAP messages are secure and will focus on 
EAP-TLS handshake which includes the messages 
from 4 to 9. There are a number of optional messages 
and we will ignore them in our analysis. The full 
handshake is sometimes unnecessary, where the 
wireless device can resume a session with a fresh 
nonce and an existing session identifier. Then the 
authentication server will reply a fresh nonce to 
resume the specific session. The wireless device and 
authentication server have stored a master key from 
which they can derive the session keys. They finish 
messages exchange between them by confirming 
these keys [14].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: EAP-TLS handshake. 
 
The first message in TLS handshake is Client 
Hello. It contains the client name A, client random 
number Na and a session identifier Sid [14]. It 
represents as follows: 
 
Client Hello:  A, Na, Sid 
 
The second message in TLS handshake is the 
Server Hello containing server random number Ns 
and the session identifier Sid [14]. It represents as 
follows: 
 
Server Hello :  Ns; Sid 
 
The third message in TLS handshake is the 
Server Certificate including a certificate signed by a 
trusted third party containing server's public key 
[14]. It represents as follows: 
 
Server Certificate: Certificate(B, Kb) 
 
The fourth message in TLS handshake is the 
Client Key Exchange including the random number 
generated by client called Pre-master secret (PMS) 
encrypted by server's public key [14]. It represents as 
follows: 
 
Client Key Exchange : {PMS} 
 
The last two messages are Client Finished and 
Server Finished. The Client Finished message is the 
hash of all previous messages encrypted by the 
symmetric key clientK. The Server Finished message 
is the hash of all previous messages encrypted by the 
symmetric key serverK [14]. They represent as 
follows: 
 
Client Finished : {Finished}ClientK 
 
Server Finished : {Finished}ServerK 
 
2.1.2. The 4-way handshake phase. The 4-way 
handshake is essential in the IEEE 802.11i protocol, 
aiming to verify that the access point is legitimate to 
generate the PMK. Figure 3 shows that the 4-way 
handshake exchanges messages at abstract level, 
where AA and SPN represent the MAC address of 
the access point and wireless device, respectively. 
SNonce represents the access point nonce. and 
ANonce represents the nonce of the wireless device. 
The msg1, 2, 3, 4 refer to several message types; sn 
is sequence number. MICPTK {} refers to the 
Message Integrity Code (MIC) that uses the fresh 
PTK to calculate the integrity code of contents 
between the braces. MIC is used instead of Message 
Authentication Code (MAC) for cryptography 
because the meaning of MAC in network is medium 
access control [15]. 
 
PTK = PRF-X(PMK, Pairwise key expansion || 
Min {AA, SPA} || Max {AA, SPA} || Min {ANonce, 
SNone}|| Max {ANonce, SNone}) 
 
The fresh PTK is divided into three keys. The 
first key is the Key Confirmation Key (KCK), which 
is only used to calculate MIC. The second key is the 
Key Encryption Key (KEK) and the third key is the 
Temporary Key (TK). The KEK and TK are not used 
in the authentication process, so they will be ignored 
in this paper [3]. 
The wireless device and the access point can 
discard a message in the 4-way handshake when 
receiving a message with unexpected sequence 
number or invalid MIC. Message 1 is unacceptable 
for the wireless device when it is received after the 
Wireless               Authentication 
 devices                    server 
1. EAP Request Identity  
 
2. EAP Respond Identity  
 
3. EAP-TLS ( Start)  
 
4. Client-Hello  
 
5. Server-Hello  
 
6. Server Certificate  
 
7. Client Key Exchange  
 
8. Client Finished  
 
9. Server Finished  
 
10. EAP Success  
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time interval of successful 802.11i authentication. In 
this case, the wireless device tries to authenticate 
with same access point or another one after 
disassociating and de-authenticating the current 
access point. On the other side, if the access point 
has not received a message before time out then it 
will re-send within configured time intervals. 
Moreover, the access point will de-authenticate the 
wireless device if it has never received any reply 
from the wireless device [3]. 
 
 
                
                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                          
                                           
 
3. A framework implemented in Isabelle 
 
Isabelle tool is widely used to reason a formal 
system based on higher order logic. Bella defined 
Isabelle tool as “a generic, interactive theorem 
prover” [16]. Isabelle provides a high level 
automation, which means human intervention 
required is lower than many other tools. Paulson is 
one of the researchers who have used Isabelle to 
prove the correctness of a number of protocols, such 
as the internet protocol TLS [14]. In this paper, 
Isabelle is used to analyse the 4-way handshake 
phase of 802.11i standard. 
 
3.1. A Framework for analysing protocols 
using linear temporal logic 
 
Isabelle can be used to verify and prove the 
correctness of security protocols. Four steps are 
followed to analyse protocols using Isabelle tool. 
First, adjust the framework slightly for the protocol 
to be verified. The reason is that the framework is a 
template and requires accommodating the minor 
differences amongst various security protocols. 
Then, model the protocol steps by rewriting the 
protocol to make it compatible with the language 
used in the framework. After that, prove basic and 
essential properties of the protocol, which can be 
reused for other protocols. Finally, prove security 
properties of the protocol based on the proof of the 
basic properties mentioned above. In the next 
section, we will follow these steps and use the 
framework proposed by Alabdulatif et al [5, 6]. 
 
3.2. Framework adjustment 
 
The framework requires a slight amendment to be 
appropriate for analysing the EAP-TLS handshake 
and 4-way handshake protocol. The access point AP 
and the wireless device SP are honest agents and the 
attacker here is called Spy. Also, the trusted third 
party is denoted as TTP. The definition of agent will 
be modified as: 
 
datatype    agent = SP | AP | Spy | TTP 
 
In the EAP-TLS handshake, the wireless device 
and the authentication server exchange some random 
values. The random type consists of PMS and 
MASTERKEY representing the pre-master secret 
and the master key, respectively. Also, Na represents 
the random value generated by wireless device for 
the current session and the Ns represents the random 
value generated by authentication server for the 
current session. Sid is the random value representing 
the session identifier generated by the wireless 
device. The random type can be defined as follows: 
 
datatype  random = PMS | MASTERKEY | Na | 
Ns | Sid 
 
The wireless device uses Na, Ns and 
MASTERKEY random values in the EAP-TLS 
handshake to generate the symmetric key SPK to 
encrypt Client Finished message. Whereas, the 
authentication server uses the same values to 
generate the symmetric key ASK to encrypt Server 
Finished message. The SPK and ASK can be defined 
as follows:  
 
SPK :: random  * random * random => nat  
ASK :: random * random * random => nat 
 
Similarly, in the 4-way handshake four new 
nonces are used, with SN and SN1 representing the 
sequence number and the sequence number +1, 
respectively. The SNonce and ANonce are fresh 
nonces chosen by agents SP and AP, respectively. 
Therefore, the definition of nonce will be 
modified as: 
Derive 
(PTK) 
Verify 
 MIC & 
ANonce  
 
Install 
 (PTK)  
Update 
 sn  
Figure 3: 4-way handshake. 
 
Wireless  
Device   
Access    
point 
AA, ANonce, sn, Msg1  
 
SPA, SNonce, sn, Msg2, MIC 
PTK { SNonce, sn, Msg2}  
 
Derive 
(PTK) 
 
AA, ANonce, sn+1, Msg3, 
MICPTK{ANonce,sn+1,Msg3} 
 
Verify 
SNonce  
Verify MIC 
Install (PTK)  
Update sn  
 
SPA, sn+1, Msg4, MIC PTK{ 
sn+1, Msg4} 
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datatype nonce = SN | SN1 | SNonce | ANonce 
 
In addition, a new type will be defined for Msg1, 
Msg2, Msg3 and Msg4. This type will be called 
Messages and added as follows:  
 
datatype  Masseges = Msg1 | Msg2 | Msg3 | 
Msg4 
 
Since the 4-way handshake uses the Message 
Integrity Code and typed messages, we need to add 
two constructors for datatype msg. They can be 
defined in msg datatype:   
 
datatype msg =Mag Masseges 
                       | MIC msg key 
 
Besides the type definitions, the analysis requires 
several new actions to represent their behaviours 
during the authentication process. The three new 
actions are added as follows: 
 
    Discard ::   agent => msg => Formula 
    Block ::     agent => msg => Formula 
    RRcv ::     agent => msg => Formula  
 
The Discard action represents the behaviour of an 
agent when ignoring received message. The Block 
action represents the behaviour of an agent when 
removing the message from the network so that the 
recipient cannot receive the message. The behaviour 
of an agent receiving the same message more than 
once can be represented by the RRcv action.  
Since new definitions and actions have been 
added into the framework, it is necessary to introduce 
a set of new rules to describe new properties: 
 
Rule 1.1 : S |= RRcv A M   (S < t) ) => t |= 
  (Discard A M). 
 
This rule says that if an agent receives the same 
message more than once, then the agent will always 
discard this message. 
 
Rule 1.2 : (S |= Rcv A M)   (t |= Rcv A M) ) => (t |= 
RRcv A M)    (S < t). 
 
This rule says that if an agent receives a message 
at moment S and receives the same message at 
moment t, then the agent receives the message more 
than once. 
 
Rule 1.3 : (S |= Rcv Spy M)   (S |= Block Spy M) ) 
=>  X:(S |= (Neg (Rcv X M))). 
 
This rule says that if the attacker receives a 
message and blocks it, then other agents in the 
network cannot receive this message. 
After adjusting the framework is suitable for 
analysing the EAP-TLS handshake and 4-way 
handshake stages. We will analyse these stages 
separately. 
 
4. Analysing EAP-TLS handshake 
 
The next steps to analyse the EAP-TLS 
handshake protocol are modelling the protocol and 
proving the basic and security properties. 
 
4.1. Modelling the EAP-TLS handshake 
 
Normally, a protocol is written in informal 
language as shown in figure 2. The EAP-TLS 
handshake protocol steps for the honest agents 
should be formalised. The six steps of EAP-TLS 
handshake can be formalised in the framework as 
follows: 
 
ClientHello: S |= Send SP AS ({Agent SP,{Random 
Na, Random Sid}})   (S < t) => t |= Rcv AS ({Agent 
SP, {Random Na, Random Sid}}) 
 
ServerHello: S |= Rcv AS ({Agent SP, {Random 
Na,Random Sid}}) => t|=Send AS SP ({Random Ns, 
Random Sid})   (S < t). 
 
SendServerCertificate: S |= Send AS SP ({Random 
Ns, Random Sid})   (S < t) => t |= Send AS SP 
(Cert({Agent AS, Key (Kpb (AS))}) (Kpb (TTP))) 
 
SendClientKeyExchange: S |= Know SP (Encrypt 
(Random (PMS)) ((Kpb (AS)))) => t |= Send SP AS 
(Encrypt (Random (PMS)) ((Kpb (AS))))   (S < t) 
 
SendClientFinished: S |= Send SP AS (Encrypt 
(Hash {Finished})((Ksym SP AS(SPK (Na, Ns, 
MASTERKEY ))))) => t |= Rcv AS (Encrypt (Hash 
{Finished})((Ksym SP AS (SPK (Na, Ns, 
MASTERKEY )))))   t |= Verify AS (Encrypt (Hash 
{Finished})((Ksym SP AS(SPK (Na, Ns, 
MASTERKEY )))))   (S < t) 
 
SendServerFinished: S |= Rcv AS (Encrypt (Hash 
{Finished})((Ksym SP AS(SPK (Na, Ns, 
MASTERKEY)))))   S |= Verify AS  (Encrypt 
(Hash {Finished})((Ksym SP AS(SPK (Na, Ns, 
MASTERKEY )))))   (S < t) => t |= Send AS SP  
(Encrypt (Hash {Finished})((Ksym SP AS (ASK (Na, 
Ns, MASTERKEY))))) 
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4.2. Verifying basic properties 
 
In proving the EAP-TLS handshake, basic 
properties proved for Needham-Schroeder public key 
protocol can be reused. Thus, there are not any basic 
properties that should be specifically proved for 
EAP-TLS handshake. 
 
4.3. Verifying security properties 
 
The first security property is knowMasterkey and 
it says that if the wireless device receives the 
authentication server’s public key in the certificate 
signed by a trusted third party, then the 
authentication server will know the master key. This 
property can be proved as follows: 
 
lemma knowMasterkey : S |= Rcv SP (Cert ({Agent 
AS, Key (Kpb (AS))}) (Kpb (TTP)))   S |= Generate 
SP (Random (PMS))   (S < t) => t |= Know AS 
(Random (MASTERKEY )) 
 
apply(rule KnownMasterKey) 
apply(rule KnownEncryptMessage) 
apply(rule SendClientKeyExchange) 
apply(rule Rule 1) 
apply(rule KnowcertMessage) 
apply(auto) 
done 
 
The second security property is LTShandshake 
which says that when the wireless device sends client 
hello message at moment S, then the authentication 
server will send server finished message at moment t. 
Similarly, this property can be proved as follows: 
 
lemma LTShandshake: S |= Send SP AS ({Agent SP, 
{Random Na, Random Sid}})   (S < t)  => t |= Send 
AS SP  (Encrypt (Hash {Finished})((Ksym SP AS 
(ASK  (Na, Ns, MASTERKEY))))) 
 
apply(rule SendServerFinished ) 
apply(rule SendClientFinished ) 
apply(rule KnowserverMaster) 
apply(rule knowMasterkey) 
apply(rule RcvServerCertificate) 
apply(rule SendServerCertificate) 
apply(rule ServerHello) 
apply(rule ClientHello) 
apply(auto) 
done 
 
In the verification of the EAP-TLS handshake 
phase, the pre-master secret is difficult to know by 
any agent except the authentication server and the 
wireless device. The difficulty is because the pre-
master secret is encrypted by the public key of the 
authentication server when sent over the network. 
This has been shown in the proof of the lemma 
KnownMasterKey. The lemma LTShandshake proves 
the correctness of EAP-TLS handshake and that it 
meets the targets of security. Therefore, we can 
conclude that the EAP-TLS handshake phase of 
802.11i standard is secure. 
 
5. Analysing 4-way handshake 
 
The next steps to analyse the 4-way handshake 
protocol are modelling the protocol and prove the 
basic and security properties. 
 
5.1. Modelling the 4-way handshake 
 
Normally, a protocol is written in informal 
language as shown in figure 3. In this part we will 
therefore formalise the steps of the 4-way handshake 
as four formal formulas for all honest agents as 
follows: 
 
FHShake1: S |= Send AP SP ({Agent AP,{Nonce 
ANonce, {Mag Msg1, Nonce (SN)}}}). 
 
FHShake2: (S |= Send AP SP({Agent AP, 
{Nonce ANonce, {Mag Msg1{ Nonce (SN)}}})) => 
t |= Send SP AP ({Agent SP, { Nonce SNonce, 
{Mag Msg2, {Nonce (SN), MIC {Nonce SNonce, 
{Mag Msg2, Nonce (SN)}} k}}}})   (S< t). 
 
FHShake3: S |= Send SP AP ({Agent SP, 
{ Nonce SNonce, {Mag Msg2, {Nonce (SN), 
MIC {Nonce SNonce, {Mag Msg2, Nonce (SN)}} 
k}}}})   (S < t)  => t |= Send AP SP({Agent AP, 
{Nonce ANonce, {Mag Msg3, {Nonce (SN1), MIC 
{Nonce ANonce, {Mag Msg3, Nonce(SN1)}} 
k}}}}). 
 
FHShake4: S |= Send AP SP({Agent AP, 
{Nonce ANonce, {Mag Msg3, {Nonce (SN1), 
MIC {Nonce ANonce, {Mag Msg3, Nonce (SN1)}} 
k}}}}) => t |= Send SP AP ({Agent SP, {Mag Msg4, 
{Nonce (SN1), MIC {Mag Msg4, Nonce (SN1)} 
k}}})    (S< t). 
 
The access point will re-send message 1 and 
message 3 if it did not receive the reply during the 
per-defined time interval. The access point will 
continue to re-send and, after timeout, will de-
authenticate the wireless device if there is no reply 
from it. There are two rules for re-sending the 
message 1 and message 3, as described below: 
 
ReplayMessage1: S |= ¬(Rcv AP ({Agent SP,{ 
Nonce SNonce, {Mag Msg2, {Nonce (SN), MIC 
{Nonce SNonce, {Mag Msg2, Nonce (SN)}} 
k}}}}))   (S< t) => S |= Send AP SP ({Agent AP, 
{Nonce ANonce, {Mag Msg1, Nonce (SN)}}}) 
 
ReplayMessage3: S |= ¬(Rcv SP ({Agent SP, 
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{Mag Msg4, {Nonce (SN1), MIC {Mag Msg4, 
Nonce (SN1)} k}}}))   (S < t) => t |= Send AP SP 
({Agent AP, {Nonce ANonce, {Mag Msg3, 
{Nonce (SN1), MIC {Nonce ANonce, {Mag Msg3, 
Nonce (SN1)}} k}}}})   (t < outtime)   
(intervaltime < t) 
 
The attacker has the ability to block any 
messages over the network. So if any agent sends a 
message, the attacker can block it and the recipient 
will not be able to receive it. The rule for blocking 
message 4 can be represented in the framework as 
follows: 
 
BlockMessage4: S |= Send SP AP ({Agent SP, {Mag 
Msg4, {Nonce (SN1), MIC {Mag Msg4, Nonce 
(SN1)} k}}}) => S |= Block Spy ({Agent SP, 
{Mag Msg4, {Nonce (SN1), MIC {Mag Msg4, 
Nonce (SN1)} k}}}). 
 
5.2. Verifying basic properties 
 
The first basic property is discarding the received 
messages. The reason for an agent discarding a 
received message is because the same message is 
received more than once. So for security reasons the 
agent should discard the duplicate copies of a 
message. The first property says that when agent A 
sends a message to agent B more than once, then 
agent B will always discard the message: 
 
lemma DiscardReceivedMessage : (S |= Send A B 
M)   (S < t) => (t |=    (Discard B M)) 
 
apply (rule Rule 1.1) 
apply (rule Rule 1.2) 
apply (rule conjI) 
apply (rule Rule 8) 
apply (auto) 
apply (rule Rule 8) 
apply (auto) 
done. 
 
The second basic property is a special case of the 
blocked message 4 by the attacker. This property 
says that when the wireless device sends message 4, 
then the message may not be received by the access 
point if it is blocked by the attacker. 
 
lemma NotReceivedMessage4FromSender : 
S |= Send SP AP ({Agent SP, {Mag Msg4, {Nonce 
(SN1), MIC {Mag Msg4, Nonce (SN1)} k}}}) 
  (S < t) => S |= ¬ (Rcv AP ({Agent SP, {Mag 
Msg4, {Nonce (SN1), MIC {Mag Msg4, Nonce 
(SN1)} k}}})) 
 
apply(rule allE) 
apply(rule Rule 1.3) 
apply(auto) 
apply(rule Eavesdropping rule) 
apply (auto) 
apply (rule BlockMessage4) 
apply (auto) 
done 
 
6. Denial of service attack on the protocol 
 
 In a DoS attack, the adversary prevents or 
inhibits protocols from completing successfully. 
Simply speaking, it involves disabling or preventing 
servers who are required to interact with participants. 
Most protocols have the potential to be attacked by 
DoS; however, the design of a protocol could 
improve prevention, or make such attacks more 
unlikely [17]. It is impossible to fully protect 
protocols against DoS attacks. 
 
6.1. DoS Attack on the 4-way handshake 
 
The sequence number (sn) is a technique used to 
prevent reply attacks in the 4-way handshake. sn is a 
counter set to 0 when establishing PMK then 
incremented with successive messages. The wireless 
device and the access point assume that they have the 
same sn value before running the 4-way handshake. 
During the running of the 4-way handshake the 
wireless device should update the sn value when 
receiving the message 3, while the access point 
should update the sn value after receiving the 
message 4 as shown in figure 1. As a result, at the 
end of the 4-way handshake we assume that they will 
have the same sn value. If the wireless device and 
access point have different sn values at the end of the 
4-way handshake they will de-authenticate each 
other and cannot start future sessions. 
The sn value can be a potential vulnerability in 
the 4-way handshake. The wireless device and the 
access point will continue running the 4-way 
handshake until time out without knowing the 
attacker having blocked message 4. The access point 
will re-send message 3 if it does not receive message 
4 while the wireless device discards these messages 
as shown in figure 4. This attack happens because 
each side has different values of sn. A simple effort 
of the attacker, which blocks message 4 once then 
lets the protocol run as usual, can destroy the 
authentication between the wireless device and the 
access point. It is easy for the attacker to detect 
message 4 over the network because the 4-way 
handshake exchanges messages without encryption. 
One of the security properties in the 4-way 
handshake is synchronising the installation of session 
keys. The wireless device installs the session key 
after receiving message 3 and the access point will 
install it after receiving message 4. In Isabelle tool, a 
lemma shows that the wireless device will discard 
message 3 resent by the access point. As a result, if 
the wireless device discards message 3, message 4 
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will not be received by the access point and the 
access point cannot install the session keys. The 
proving scripts of this lemma are as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
lemma FindAttackinFourhandshack : S |=   ( 
Discard SP ({Agent AP, {Nonce ANonce, {Mag 
Msg3, {Nonce (SN1), MIC {Nonce ANonce, {Mag 
Msg3, Nonce (SN1)}} k}}}})) 
 
apply(rule DiscardReceivedMessage) 
apply(rule ReplayMessage3) 
apply(rule NotReceivedMessage4FromSender) 
apply(rule FHShake4) 
apply(rule FHShake3) 
apply(rule FHShake2) 
apply(rule FHShake1) 
done 
 
PMK is important to reduce the authentication 
process costs that occur every time PTK is 
established or updated. If PMK has already existed 
they can run the 4-way handshake to obtain new PTK 
for transferring the data over the network. If the 
attacker can block message 4 then at the end of the 4-
way handshake, PMK will be invalid and 802.1X 
authentication need to be run every time. As we 
know, the attacker has the ability to block any 
messages over the network, therefore it is easy for 
the attacker to block specifically message 4. 
Consequently, the attacker can de-authenticate the 
access point with all wireless devices wanting to 
connect during the 4-way handshake phase. The DoS 
attack identified in this paper is easy to implement 
over the network and it is difficult to prevent. A 
number of attempts to prevent DoS proposed by 
some researchers failed to defend against all DoS in 
the 4-way handshake. 
 
6.2. Preventing the DoS attacks on message 4 
 
A number of researchers have already discussed 
and proposed some solutions to avoid the DoS attack 
in the 4-way handshake. He and Mitchell provided 
two solutions to avoid DoS attacks on the wireless 
device side [11,18]. In addition, Rango et al. 
discussed the He and Mitchell solutions and 
introduced two new solutions to prevent DoS attacks 
[19]. Unfortunately, all these solutions are unsuitable 
to prevent the DoS attack identified in this paper. 
Therefore, we are going to introduce a new solution 
for this attack. 
The sn value plays an important role in 
preventing replay attacks. The access point usually 
checks the sn value of received message 
corresponding to the outstanding message. Whereas, 
the wireless point checks the sn value used before 
with current PMK. Moreover, when the access point 
does not receive reply message during the timeout 
interval, it will keep re-sending the message until 
time out. The re-sent message has the same content 
as the original message and is valid from the point of 
view of the access point. The wireless device will 
likely discard the re-sent message if it has seen the 
original message, which is valid for the access point. 
So there is a contradiction between using sn value 
and re-sending the original message. In other words, 
the recipient will be confused with the re-sent 
message and the original message where both are 
valid. 
In order to prevent from discarding the valid 
messages by the wireless device, the access point 
should update the sn value immediately after sending 
the message. So, when the access point wants to re-
send the original message, a new sn value will be 
used. The sn value makes the resent message 
different from the original message and therefore the 
wireless device is not going to discard the resent 
message. As shown in figure 5, if the access point 
has not received message 4 during interval time out, 
then message 3 will be re-sent with the new sn value. 
As a result, the simple amendment will reduce the 
chance of message 4 being attacked. Also, the 
wireless device is not going to discard the valid 
messages [20]. 
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Figure 4: An Attack on the 4-way 
Handshake. 
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6.3. Proving the fixed protocol using Isabelle 
 
In order to prove that the DoS attack on the 4-
way handshake can be prevented the replayed 
message 3 should be modified according to the 
proposed solution. Suppose that the access point 
should rename the sn1 value to become sn after 
sending message 3. Meanwhile, the updated sn value 
will become sn1. So, the replayed message 3 will be 
changed every time it is re-sent; therefore, it is not 
going to be discarded by the wireless device [20]. 
The replayed message 3 can be re-written as follows: 
 
ReplayMessage3New : S |= :(Rcv SP ({Agent SP, 
{Mag Msg4, {Nonce (SN), MIC {Mag Msg4, 
Nonce (SN)} k}}}))   (S< t) => t |= Send AP SP 
({Agent AP, {Nonce ANonce, {Mag Msg3, 
{Nonce (SN1), MIC {Nonce ANonce,{Mag Msg3, 
Nonce (SN1)}} k}}}})       (t < outtime)    
(intervaltime < t) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following script shows that the access point 
will keep sending the message 3 until receiving 
message 4 or the finish time of the session. Whereas, 
the wireless device is not going to discard the re-sent 
message 3 because it is not the same as the previous 
message 3 which has been received. 
 
FixDoSAttack : t |= Send AP SP ({Agent AP, 
{Nonce ANonce, {Mag Msg3, {Nonce (SN1), MIC 
{Nonce ANonce, {Mag Msg3, Nonce (SN1)}} 
k}}}})   (t < outtime)   (intervaltime < t) 
 
apply(rule ReplayMessage3New) 
apply(rule NotReceivedMessage4FromSender) 
apply(rule FHShake4) 
apply(rule FHShake3) 
apply(rule FHShake2) 
apply(rule FHShake1) 
done 
 
7. Conclusion and future work 
 
The 4-way handshake phase in the IEEE 802.11i 
standard has been analysed and a DoS attack has 
been identified. Isabelle tool has been used to 
implement the linear temporal logic framework. The 
adjustment of the framework, the modelling of the 
protocol and the proving of basic properties have 
been used for analysing the 4-way handshake. More 
importantly, a new effective DoS attack by blocking 
message 4 has been identified and analysed. 
The protocol uses the sn value to avoid replay 
attacks in the 4-way handshake. However, the 
analysis has shown that the sn value will be a flaw if 
message 4 is not received by the access point. Non-
receipt of message 4 can be caused by the attacker or 
anything else. In this case, the authentication 
between the wireless device and the access point will 
fail. Simply updating the sn value after sending 
message 3 can prevent the attack. Moreover, it is 
possible for the access point to obtain the reply 
message for message 3.  A fixed version of the 
protocol has been proposed and the security of it has 
been proved using the framework with Isabelle. 
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